Many U$.$S$.$ companies have recently been moving toward

a heavyweight$-$project$-$management structure. Heavyweight project managers coordinate all the

specialists from functional departments around a common project with a common set of goals. Their

authority in these matrix organisations comes from their complete control over their particular project

rather than from any direct supervisory authority over the individual functions.

Toyota's equivalent is the chief engineer. Each chief engineer, based in one of Toyota's three

vehicle$-$development centers $($which oversee long$-$term planning across projects$),$ maintains full

responsibility for a single vehicle program but wields no direct power over the functions.

Indeed, Toyota's chief engineers come close to matching what others have described as the

prototypical heavyeight project manager. Before attaining their position, they must demonstrate

both exemplary technical expertise and fluency in synthesising technical knowledge into clever,

innovative designs. Toyota's managers feel strongly that only a good designer can evaluate the

quality of someone else's design. Chief engineers also need to be able to conceptualize whole

systems. It is one thing to understand the mechanics of a brake system and another to apply that knowledge toward an actual brake system design; but it is quite another thing to be able to

conceptualize a brake system and visualize how it can be integrated with the rest of the vehicle. By contrast, a number of companies with heavyweight product managers do not have such stringent

technical requirements.

All chief engineers have a small staff of $5$ to $15$ engineers to assist them in managing the

development process and in coordinating the work of the functional specialties. The hundreds of

other engineers on the project report only through the functional chain of command. The chief

engineer has no formal authority over them, so he must "persuade" them to help him realize his

vision for the vehicle. One former chief engineer described the position as being the "president of the

vehicle": just as the U$.$S$.$ president heads the country but has no direct authority over legislation

$($beyond vetoes$),$ so a chief engineer cannot dictate what functional engineers do$.$ But his extensive

technical expertise wins him tremendous respect, even admiration, from functional engineers$-$a key

source of his enormous informal authority.

The limits on the chief engineers' power, despite their prestige, are real, and the engineering

expertise and equal rank of the general managers in charge of the functional areas can keep chief

engineers from making potentially dangerous mistakes. For example, in designing a new model of

the Celica sports car several years ago, the styling department suggested a longer front$-$quarter

panel. The change would have increased the panel's extension into the top of the front door,

allowing the door to curve back at the top, thereby creating an angular and more exciting look. The

manufacturing engineer assigned to door panels, however, opposed the change because the altered

panel would be difficult to produce.

After assessing both sides, the chief engineer for the vehicle favored the altered front panel.

Nevertheless, the manufacturing engineer felt strongly that the change was unwise. If Toyota had

organized around projects rather than functions, styling would likely have gotten its way, and the car

might well have suffered production problems. But because the chief engineer's authority was only

informal, the manufacturing engineer was able to raise the issue to the level of the general manager

of manufacturing, who strongly challenged the chief engineer. After substantial argument, the two

sides reached an innovative compromise that achieved the cutaway look that styling wanted with a

satisfactory level of manufacturability.

Such incidents explain why one Toyota engineer, when asked what makes a good car, replied, "Lots

of conflict." Conflict occurs when people from different functional areas clearly represent the issues

from their perspective. Its absence implies that some functional areas are being too accommodating$-$to the detriment of the project as a whole. Still, when managers resolve conflicts

through organisational influence, horse trading, or executive fiat, the results are often poor. It is the ability of chief engineers to see the broad picture clearly$-$and the ability of functional managers to

contain the chief engineer's enthusiasm$-$that leads to highly integrated designs. And while the chief

engineers keep individual projects on track, the autonomous functional engineers and managers

ensure that knowledge and experience from other projects are not forgotten in the current one.

$2\mathrm{.}1$ Discuss the portfolio of skills of a project manager. $($Refer to case study$)(16)$

$2\mathrm{.}2$ List the project management integration tasks