monopolist serves a market with an aggregate demand function given by Q $=36-3$P$.$ Themonopolist's cost function is given by C $($Q$)=2$Q$.$a$)$ How much profit can the monopolist generate with first$-$degree price discrimination if$[6]$resale can be prevented?b$)$ What is the associated deadweight loss relative to the competitive level of output? $[10]$c$)$ Suppose that the monopolist can partition its market into two separate submarkets. Thedemand function for submarket $1$ is given by Q$1=20-2$P$1$ and the demand function forsubmarket $2$ is given by Q$2=16-$ P$2.$i$.$ What prices would this monopolist set if she practices third degree price discrimination?$[10]$ii$.$ What is the level of profits that would be realised if resale can be prevented? i$.$ What level of profits would the monopolist realise if resale cannot be prevented? $[7)$ iv$.$ Does price discrimination in this case lead to higher economic welfare? Provide theeconomic basis for your claim.$[10]$d$)$ Suppose that this monopolist must incur up$-$front entry costs of $S before it enters this market. What inference can you draw about the value of S if the monopolist enters the market when allowed to practice third$-$degree price discrimination but does not enter the market when constrained to uniform monopoly pricing?