Question: Multi-Party Electoral Competition - In class, we assumed that there are two parties competing in the election. Let us consider the alternative case with three
Multi-Party Electoral Competition - In class, we assumed that there are two parties competing in the election. Let us consider the alternative case with three contending parties, A, B and C. Other parts of the game remains the same. In particular, the election is decided by plurality rule, so the party with the largest vote count (share) wins. Moreover, when there is a tie, the tying parties each win with equal probabilities. (a) Consider the action profile where all three parties choose xm = 12. Is 12, 12, 21 a Nash equilibrium? Explain. (b) Now consider the action profile (xA,xB,xC) = 1, 2, 2. Is it a Nash equilibrium? 333 Explain
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