Nash Equilibrium problem

Two players bargain over how to split $ 10. Each player i {1, 2} chooses a number si [0, 10) (which does not need to be an integer). Each player's payoff is the money he receives. We consider two allocation rules. In each case, if S1 + S2 10 and 81 # 82, the player who chose the smallest amount receives this amount and the other gets zero. If $1 + $2 > 10 and si = 82, they both get $5. What are the (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium? Q2: 3. Now suppose that 81 and 82 must be integers. Does this change Nash Equilibrium in Q1? Two players bargain over how to split $ 10. Each player i {1, 2} chooses a number si [0, 10) (which does not need to be an integer). Each player's payoff is the money he receives. We consider two allocation rules. In each case, if S1 + S2 10 and 81 # 82, the player who chose the smallest amount receives this amount and the other gets zero. If $1 + $2 > 10 and si = 82, they both get $5. What are the (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium? Q2: 3. Now suppose that 81 and 82 must be integers. Does this change Nash Equilibrium in Q1