Need help with question 2. Solved question 1 already. Thanks!

C. [This problem expands on the textbook problems 8.1 and 8.2 from Homework 3. In any given period, a monitoring agency can in- spect a facility, or not, spending its time fulfilling its other man- dated tasks. The facility being monitored can either ignore safety regulations, e.g. maintenance on fire suppression systems or the pro- vision of safety equipment, putting its employees at risk, or follow safe procedures that do not put employees at risk. This strategic situation is formalized as a 2 x 2 game with the normal Inspect | Other Ignore (7 - F, R) (7 + B, 0) Follow (7, -C) (7, 0) Here, F > 0 is the facility's fine paid for ignoring safety regulations, B > 0 is the benefit (cost savings) to ignoring them, R > 0 is the monitoring agency's net reward to finding violations, and C > 0 is their cost to inspecting a facility that is in compliance. 1. Give the facility's best response to Inspect, and to Other. Give the monitoring agency's best response to Ignore, and to Follow. With these, show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium for this game. MI. When the monitoring agency chooses to inspect, then if the facility chooses to ignore it gets a pay off of TT-F and if it chooses to follow, it gets a pay off of TT. Blc FY0, TT > 71-F the best response is to follow. MZ. When the monitoring agency chooses other, it gets a payoff of AtB and if it chooses follow, it gets a payofs of TT. Ble B YO, TT + B > TT, T > TI-F the best response is to ignore. FI. When the facility chooses to ignore, then if the monitoring agency chooses to inspect, it gets a pay off of R and if it chooses other, it gets a payoff of O. Ble RXO the best response is to inspect. F2. When the facility chooses to follow, then if the monitoring agency chooses to inspect, it gets a payoff of-c and if it chooses other, it gets a payoff of O. Ble CLO the best response is other. Action Best Response = > There is no pure strategy nash Inspect Follow Other Ignore equilibrium ble there is no Ignore Inspect intersection of best response. Follow other2. Give the monitoring agency's expected payoffs to inspecting as a function of 0:, the probability that the facility ignores regula tions, and how that the value of a that makes the monitoring agency indifferent between inspecting and doing their other - an: _ C mandated tasks is o: R+C