negotiate with these [ISIS] networks classified as terrorists' networks by international organizations and the USA, the...

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negotiate with these [ISIS] networks classified as terrorists' networks by international organizations and the USA," the memo concluded. Despite the company's efforts, workers continued to be at risk. French courts reviewed charges submitted by 11 Lafarge workers through Sherpa, a French law association whose primary mission was the protection of workers, that Lafarge placed them in a high-risk environment and put their lives in danger. "Lafarge acted as if it was above the law," said Marie-Laure Guislain, the head of litigation at Sherpa. "But it played a role in an armed conflict, as well as in the violation of human rights, and must be held accountable." Olsen resigned as CEO amidst an internal investigation of the firm's top management that found that the money funneled to the terrorist groups was used, in part, to permit factory workers to move to and from the facility. This inquiry also found that Olsen was not responsible for, or aware of, the activity. According to extensive testimony and eyewit- ness accounts of former and current employees as well as a review of internal company correspondence, the payments to the militant groups did not guarantee the safety of plant employees. More than twelve workers were kidnapped between 2012 and 2014. There were multiple accounts of employees being held at gunpoint on their way to and from work. In 2014, ISIS forces declared a caliphate, asserting their control over a region, includ- ing parts of Syria. Within weeks, as the fighting for territory continued, air strikes were heard outside the Lafarge plant. When ISIS militants claimed responsibility for the truck bombing at a Turkish-owned cement plant nearby, Lafarge temporarily halted production and told its workers to stay home. Some workers, considered nonessential by manage- 8 gaivolama,onment, were ferried by bus to operations in Manbji, a city in northern Syria. Yet, managers Jium bed you ordered about 30 workers to report to work to keep the Jalabiyeh plant operating. Ultimately, in 2015, as a team of employees and managers gathered for work one morning to aboibaut botes outside the plant, the factory's doctor warned that ISIS had just captured a nearby village. baroqque bins "You've got to get out of here," he warned. "ISIS is coming!" When the workers discov- ered that evacuation buses promised by management were not there, they escaped in their own vehicles. ISIS captured the factory that evening. "What I want to know," Mostafa Haji Mohamad, a medical worker at the Syrian factory, said of Lafarge in an interview, "is why did they leave us there to face our deaths? The factory was the only thing they cared about." abun Discussion Case: LafargeHolcim and ISIS in Syria In 2017, French authorities investigated and indicted several former executives of the world's largest cement manufacturer, LafargeHolcim (Lafarge), for paying the Islamic State terrorist group to protect their factory in Syria and its workers. The indictment charged Bruno Lafont and Eric Olsen-two former CEOS-and the former senior exec- utive of Syrian operations, Christian Herrault, with financing a terrorist organization and endangering the lives of others. Lafarge was a major multinational cement company based in France, employing 81,000 workers at 2,300 sites in 80 countries around the world. The company had maintained operations in Syria since 2010, after investing more than $708 million to refurbish a fac- tory in Jalabiyeh, a town near the Turkish border. This plant created hundreds of jobs for local residents, generated thousands of tons of cement every day, and supported other businesses nearby. Just a year after Lafarge started operations in Jalabiyeh, civil war broke out between President Bashar al-Assad's government and various rebel factions. Between 2011 and 2013, the area near the factory was occupied by a succession of armed military groups before the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) seized control. During this period, militants intercepted and detained Lafarge employees as they came and went from work, making it dangerous for employees and difficult for managers to run the plant efficiently. In 2011, Lafarge management started paying the militants through intermediaries, essentially to leave the company alone and allow it to operate. The company's subsidiary in Syria, Lafarge Cement Syria (LCS), paid about $15.2 million for this purpose between 2011 and 2014; a large part of this money went directly to ISIS. Herrault admitted that Lafarge was involved in a "racket," but said that he regularly informed top managers of the company and that everything was under control. In an official statement justifying management's decision to pay off the militant groups, the company stated, "Very simply, chaos reigned, and it was the task of local management to ensure that the intermediaries did whatever was necessary to secure its supply chains and the free movement of its employees." Lafarge said that they did not think they had any other options to keep the plant operational and minimize risks to their employees. The company also took other steps to protect its workers and keep the militants at bay. After militant forces kidnapped nine Lafarge employees and transferred them to local mili- tia camps, local managers spent more than $200,000 to secure their release. Lafarge also attempted to ease tensions by purchasing raw materials from ISIS-held areas to support the region's economy. In 2013, a Lafarge memo emphasized the threat posed by terrorists. "It becomes more and more difficult to operate without being required to directly or indirectly negotiate with these [ISIS] networks classified as terrorists' networks by international organizations and the USA," the memo concluded. Despite the company's efforts, workers continued to be at risk. French courts reviewed charges submitted by 11 Lafarge workers through Sherpa, a French law association whose primary mission was the protection of workers, that Lafarge placed them in a high-risk environment and put their lives in danger. "Lafarge acted as if it was above the law," said Marie-Laure Guislain, the head of litigation at Sherpa. "But it played a role in an armed conflict, as well as in the violation of human rights, and must be held accountable." Olsen resigned as CEO amidst an internal investigation of the firm's top management that found that the money funneled to the terrorist groups was used, in part, to permit factory workers to move to and from the facility. This inquiry also found that Olsen was not responsible for, or aware of, the activity. According to extensive testimony and eyewit- ness accounts of former and current employees as well as a review of internal company correspondence, the payments to the militant groups did not guarantee the safety of plant employees. More than twelve workers were kidnapped between 2012 and 2014. There were multiple accounts of employees being held at gunpoint on their way to and from work. In 2014, ISIS forces declared a caliphate, asserting their control over a region, includ- ing parts of Syria. Within weeks, as the fighting for territory continued, air strikes were heard outside the Lafarge plant. When ISIS militants claimed responsibility for the truck bombing at a Turkish-owned cement plant nearby, Lafarge temporarily halted production and told its workers to stay home. Some workers, considered nonessential by manage- 8 gaivolama,onment, were ferried by bus to operations in Manbji, a city in northern Syria. Yet, managers Jium bed you ordered about 30 workers to report to work to keep the Jalabiyeh plant operating. Ultimately, in 2015, as a team of employees and managers gathered for work one morning to aboibaut botes outside the plant, the factory's doctor warned that ISIS had just captured a nearby village. baroqque bins "You've got to get out of here," he warned. "ISIS is coming!" When the workers discov- ered that evacuation buses promised by management were not there, they escaped in their own vehicles. ISIS captured the factory that evening. "What I want to know," Mostafa Haji Mohamad, a medical worker at the Syrian factory, said of Lafarge in an interview, "is why did they leave us there to face our deaths? The factory was the only thing they cared about." abun Discussion Case: LafargeHolcim and ISIS in Syria In 2017, French authorities investigated and indicted several former executives of the world's largest cement manufacturer, LafargeHolcim (Lafarge), for paying the Islamic State terrorist group to protect their factory in Syria and its workers. The indictment charged Bruno Lafont and Eric Olsen-two former CEOS-and the former senior exec- utive of Syrian operations, Christian Herrault, with financing a terrorist organization and endangering the lives of others. Lafarge was a major multinational cement company based in France, employing 81,000 workers at 2,300 sites in 80 countries around the world. The company had maintained operations in Syria since 2010, after investing more than $708 million to refurbish a fac- tory in Jalabiyeh, a town near the Turkish border. This plant created hundreds of jobs for local residents, generated thousands of tons of cement every day, and supported other businesses nearby. Just a year after Lafarge started operations in Jalabiyeh, civil war broke out between President Bashar al-Assad's government and various rebel factions. Between 2011 and 2013, the area near the factory was occupied by a succession of armed military groups before the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) seized control. During this period, militants intercepted and detained Lafarge employees as they came and went from work, making it dangerous for employees and difficult for managers to run the plant efficiently. In 2011, Lafarge management started paying the militants through intermediaries, essentially to leave the company alone and allow it to operate. The company's subsidiary in Syria, Lafarge Cement Syria (LCS), paid about $15.2 million for this purpose between 2011 and 2014; a large part of this money went directly to ISIS. Herrault admitted that Lafarge was involved in a "racket," but said that he regularly informed top managers of the company and that everything was under control. In an official statement justifying management's decision to pay off the militant groups, the company stated, "Very simply, chaos reigned, and it was the task of local management to ensure that the intermediaries did whatever was necessary to secure its supply chains and the free movement of its employees." Lafarge said that they did not think they had any other options to keep the plant operational and minimize risks to their employees. The company also took other steps to protect its workers and keep the militants at bay. After militant forces kidnapped nine Lafarge employees and transferred them to local mili- tia camps, local managers spent more than $200,000 to secure their release. Lafarge also attempted to ease tensions by purchasing raw materials from ISIS-held areas to support the region's economy. In 2013, a Lafarge memo emphasized the threat posed by terrorists. "It becomes more and more difficult to operate without being required to directly or indirectly