No$.14-1430$

Keller v$.$ Miri Microsystems

Page $4$

$$110$ per installation and $$60$ for each repair he performed. Miri did not withhold federal payroll taxes from Keller's payments or provide Keller benefits.

On November $23,2012,$ Keller stopped working for Miri. Soon thereafter, he filed this lawsuit, alleging that Miri's payment system violates the FLSA. Miri filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Keller was an independent contractor for Miri, and therefore he was not entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA. The district court granted Miri's motion for summary judgment, holding that Keller was an independent contractor for Miri, not an employee. Keller appeals. Miri also argues that Keller has not produced evidence to substantiate his claim that he worked more than forty hours per week.

II$.$ DISCUSSION

A$.$ Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court's order granting summary judgment, applying the standard set forth in Rule $56($a$).$ Ellington v$,$ City of E$.$ Cleveland, $689$ F$\mathrm{.}3$d $549,552(6$th Cir. $2012).$ Summary judgment is proper when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.". Fed. R$.$ Civ. P$,$ S$6($a$)$; see also Celotex Corp. v$.$ Catrett, $477$ U$.$S$.317,322(1986).$ When conducting a review of the evidence under Rule $56($a$),$ we view the evidence, "and all inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most faworable to the non$-$moving party"$-$Keller. Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v$.$ OPPCO, LLC$,219$ F$\mathrm{.}3$d $547,551(6$th Cir. $2000).$ Summary judgment is improper if Keller has produced evidence $"$ such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict" in his favor. Id$.($quoting Anderson v$.$ Liberty Lobby, Inc., $477$ U$.$S$.242,248(1986)).$ "The relevant inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one$-$sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."$\text{'}$ Id$.($quoting Anderson, $477$ U$.$S$.$ at $251-52).$

Whether a FLSA plaintiff is an employee is a mixed question of law and fact. Lilley $v.$ BTM Corp., $958F\mathrm{.}2d746,750n\mathrm{.}1(6$th Cir. $1992)."[$W$]$here there is a genuine issue of fact or conflicting inferences can be drawn from the undisputed facts, $...$ the question is to be resolved by the finder of fact in accordance with the appropriate rules of law" $"$Id$.($holding that employee