Now consider another game between a principal (P) and agent (A) .The agent must choose to either work Hard (H) or to Slack (S) and the principal must choose whether to Audit (A) the agent’s effort or to Not Audit (N). The timing and payoffs of the game are as follows. The agent A chooses first whether to work H or to S. If the agent chooses to work H, the game is over and the agent receives a payoff of 8 and the principal gets 25. If the agent chooses S, this choice is observed by the principal before she must choose either to Audit, or to Not Audit. If the agent chooses Slack and the principal Audit, the payoffs are 7 to the agent and 18 to the principal. If the agent chooses S and the principal opts for Not Audit the payoffs are 10 and 20 to the agent and the principal, respectively

What are the Nash equilibria of this game?