Question: Now suppose there are two bidders, with values uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Consider an SPSB auction with reserve price r = 1/2 (a reserve

Now suppose there are two bidders, with values uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Consider an SPSB auction with reserve price r = 1/2 (a reserve price works by requiring bids to be at least r, and setting the payment of the winning bidder to the maximum of r and the second highest bid). What is the expected revenue

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