Oligopoly $-$ End of Chapter Problem

$\backslash$table$[[$Oligopoly $-$ End of Chapter Problem,Price of botted mater per liter,$\backslash$table$[[$Quantity of bottled$],[$water demanded$],[($millions of titers$)]]],[$In France, the market for botuled water is controlled by two large firms, Perrier and,,$],[$Evian$.$ Each firm has a fixed cost of $1$ million and a constant marginal cost of $2$ per liter of borted water $(1=1$ euro$).$ The table gives the market demand schedule for,e$10,0],[$botted water in France.,$9,1],[$a$.$ Suppose the two firms form a cartel and act as a monopolist. Calculate marginal revenue for the cartel. What will the monopoly price and output be$?$ Assuming the,$8,2],[$firms divide the output evenly, how much will each produce and what will each firm's,$7,3],[$profits be$?,6,4],[,5,5],[,4,6],[,3,7],[,2,8],[,1,9]]$

Price: $/$ litier

Output: $$ million liters

Each firm produces $$ million liters

Each firm's profits: $lon$ million

b$.$ Now, suppose Perrier decides to increase production by $1$ million liters. Evian does not change its production, What will the new market price and output be$?$ What is Perrier's profit? What is Evian's profit?

Price: $$ Alter

Output: $$ million liters

Perrier's profit $l$ milliom

Bvian's profit: $$ millina

c$.$ Whas if Ferier increases production by $3$ million titers hatead of I million? Evian does not change its production. What would Ferier's ouput and profit be selative ta those ia par b$?$

Perier's $$xyme: $$ mullina tikere

Inumintion probe: $$ millioa

A firmine $$

$$ empieas