On August $14,2018,$ Jane Doe asked her boyfriend to call an Uber for her as Doe$$s phone had low battery. Doe$$s boyfriend was not with her, so she did not know which driver Uber had assigned to pick her up$.$ The car that approached Doe had an Uber decal on the car$$s windshield. Doe got into the car because she saw the Uber decal and $$she believed, perhaps mistakenly, that the driver said her boyfriend$$s name when she approached the car.$$ After she entered the vehicle, the driver activated the child$-$proof locks on the car$$s doors, drove to a remote location, and raped and partially strangled Jane Doe. The assailant then began to drive to another location, but Doe escaped and was rescued by a passing motorist. Months before Doe$$s assault, Uber had learned that the assailant, while an authorized Uber driver, had behaved disturbingly while giving another woman a ride in an Uber. Upon investigation, the assailant told Uber that he had driven the passenger off her route, flirted with her, and taken her to a horse stable. Uber suspended the assailant$$s access to the Uber app, thus taking away his ability to sign on and pick up riders as an Uber driver. However, Uber did not attempt to retrieve the Uber decal that Jane Doe recognized the day she entered the assailant$$s car. Doe argues that Uber is liable for the acts of the assailant, as he was an agent of Uber under the theory of apparent agency or$,$ alternatively, agency by ratification. Do either of these theories apply in this case? $[$Doe v$.$ Uber Technologies, Inc., No$.19-$cv$-03310-$JSC $($N$.$D$.$ Cal. $2019)]$