On November $4,1979,$ a mob in Iran stormed the U$.$S$.$ Embassy and took $52$ Americans hostage. After six months of failed negotiation, the green light was given to execute Operation Eagle Claw, a joint military effort to free the hostages.

The plan called for eight Navy RH$-53$D helicopters to fly $600$ miles to a remote site in Iran, code named Desert One. Under the cover of darkness, the helicopters would be refueled by KC$-130$ tankers$.$ The helicopters would then fly the assault force to a spot near the outskirts of Tehran, where they would meet up with special agents already in the country. The agents would lead them to a safe house to await the assault on the embassy the next night. Upon rescuing the hostages, the assault team would escort them to a nearby airfield that had already been secured by a second assault team, where they would be flown to safety.

What actually happened was far different from what was planned.

The helicopter pilots were ordered to fly at or below $200$ feet to avoid radar. This caused them to run into $$haboobs$,$ or dust storms. Two helicopters malfunctioned and turned back. The remainder battled the dust storms and arrived at Desert One one hour late. The rescue attempt was dealt its final blow when it was discovered that a third helicopter had a hydraulic leak and was inoperable. Only five aircraft were serviceable and six were needed, so the mission had to be aborted. Things got worse when one of the helicopters moved into position to refuel and collided with a KC$-130$ plane. Both aircraft burst into flames. All told, eight soldiers died and dozens were injured. The Iranians scattered the hostages around the country afterward, making any further rescue attempts impossible.

Given the gravity of the situation, a special six$-$ member commission was appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a review of the project. They identified a number of issues that contributed to the failure. One issue was the selection of the air crews. Given the significance of the mission, each military service wanted to be involved. Navy and Marine pilots with little experience in long$-$range overland navigation or refueling were chosen, even though more than $100$ experienced Air Force pilots were available. Another issue was the lack of a comprehensive mission rehearsal program. From the beginning, training was not conducted in a truly joint manner; it was compartmentalized by service and held in different locations across the United States. The limited rehearsals that were conducted assessed only segments of the total mission.

The commission concluded that $10$ and perhaps $12$ helicopters should have been launched to guarantee the minimum of $6$ required for mission completion. Finally, the hopscotch method for ground refueling was criticized. If planners had chosen en$-$route fueling, the entire Desert One scenario could have been avoided. The final report contained several important lessons learned that have contributed to subsequent successful missions, including the one against Osama bin Laden in $2011.$

After reading the case answer the following questions:

How was risk assessment and risk management integrated into the project planning and execution?

How did the project manager handle changes in scope or unforeseen challenges during the execution phase?

What contingency plans in place, and if so$,$ how were they activated $($or not$)$ during the operation's course?