Overview

HOLDINGS: [1]-Under the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendmentexclusionary rule, it was not necessary to suppress evidence from an officer's warrantless entry into defendant's garage after the officer observed defendant blaring loud music and honking unnecessarily and defendant, rather than pulling over, drove up his driveway and into his attached garage. When the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent, theexclusionary ruledoes not apply.

Outcome

The order denying defendant's motion to suppress was affirmed.

LexisNexis Headnotes

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection

Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings > Pretrial Motions & Procedures > Suppression of Evidence

HN1[]Search & Seizure, Scope of Protection

In California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional standards. The court defers to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable underU.S.4th, the court exercises its independent judgment.

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure >Exclusionary Rule

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... >Exclusionary Rule> Exceptions toExclusionary Rule> Good Faith

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure >Exclusionary Rule>RuleApplication & Interpretation

2557068

People

Lange

California,

Const.,

Amend.

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HN2[]Search & Seizure,Exclusionary Rule

Exclusion of evidence due to a Fourth Amendment violation is not automatic.U.S.4th, protects the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, but it is silent about how this right is to be enforced. To supplement the bare text, the court has created theexclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation. Theruleoperates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Theexclusionary ruleis, however, limited. The truth-in-evidence provision ofCal.Const.,art. I, 28, subd. (f)(2), prohibits application of theexclusionary ruleto evidence gathered in violation of state law unless exclusion is compelled by the federal Constitution. Under federal law, the deterrent purpose of theruleis not served by excluding evidence when an officer reasonably acts in objective good faith. If the purpose of theexclusionary ruleis to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure >Exclusionary Rule

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... >Exclusionary Rule> Exceptions toExclusionary Rule> Good Faith

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure >Exclusionary Rule>RuleApplication & Interpretation

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... >Exclusionary Rule> Exceptions toExclusionary Rule> Scope of Exceptions

Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings > Pretrial Motions & Procedures > Suppression of Evidence

HN3[]Search & Seizure,Exclusionary Rule

Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent that is later overruled is not subject to theexclusionary

rule, as suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in those circumstances.

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... >Exclusionary Rule> Exceptions toExclusionary Rule> Inevitable Discovery

HN4[]Exceptions toExclusionary Rule, Inevitable Discovery

Ordinarily, the prosecution cannot justify a search or seizure on appeal on a theory that was not presented to the trial court. This forfeiturerulehas exceptions. Mainly, it does not apply if the considerations that give rise to it are absent. The obvious reason for theruleis to prevent hunch arrests on the street, based on nothing more than confidence that a smart prosecutor will discover a legal basis in the courtroom. Thus, a theory that assumes illegal police conduct but nevertheless sustains the search or seizure, such as inevitable discovery, may be raised for the first time on appeal.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches

HN5[]Search & Seizure, Warrantless Searches

The forfeitureruleis inapplicable where there does not appear to be any further evidence that could have been introduced to defeat the theory in the trial court to justify a warrantless search or seizure and therefore the question of application of the new ground to a given set of facts is a question of law.

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure >Exclusionary Rule

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... >Exclusionary Rule> Exceptions toExclusionary Rule> Good Faith

Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedent

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... >Exclusionary Rule> Exceptions toExclusionary Rule> Scope of Exceptions

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure >Exclusionary Rule>RuleApplication &

Const.,

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Interpretation

HN6[]Search & Seizure,Exclusionary Rule

When the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent, theexclusionary ruledoes not apply.

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... >Exclusionary Rule> Exceptions toExclusionary Rule> Good Faith

HN7[]Search & Seizure, Scope of Protection

The good faith reliance doctrine is objective, fact-based, and limited. Accordingly, the good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal. When undertaking this inquiry, the court presumes responsible law- enforcement officers will take care to learn what is required of them under Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform their conduct to theserules. The objective standard requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure >Exclusionary Rule

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection

HN8[]Search & Seizure,Exclusionary Rule

Evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional underU.S.Const.,4thAmend.

Headnotes/Summary

Summary [*1114]CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL REPORTS

SUMMARY

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and operating a vehicle's sound system at excessive levels. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress all evidence collected by an officer after he entered defendant's attached garage. After the Court of Appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion, the California Supreme Court held that the flight of a suspected misdemeanant does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home, vacated the Court of Appeal's prior decision, and transferred the case back for reconsideration. (Superior Court of Sonoma County, No. SCR699391, Marjorie L. Carter, Judge.*)

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order. Under the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendmentexclusionary rule, it was not necessary to suppress evidence from the officer's warrantless entry into defendant's garage after the officer observed defendant blaring loud music and honking unnecessarily and defendant, rather than pulling over, drove up his driveway and into his attached garage. When the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent, theexclusionary ruledoes not apply. (Opinion by Jackson, P. J., with Simons and Burns, JJ., concurring.)

Headnotes

CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL REPORTS HEADNOTES

CA(1)[](1) Searches and Seizures 92RemediesSuppression

of EvidenceReview.

In California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional standards. The court defers to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable underU.S.4th, the court exercises its independent judgment.

CA(2)[](2)

*Retired judge of the Orange Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant toarticle VI, section 6 of theCalifornia Constitution.

Const.,

Amend.

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Searches and Seizures 87RemediesSuppression of EvidenceGood Faith Exception.

Exclusion of evidence due to a Fourth Amendment violation is not automatic.U.S.4th, protects the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, but it is silent about how this right is to be enforced. To supplement the bare text, the court has created theexclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation. Theruleoperates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Theexclusionary ruleis, however, limited. The truth-in-evidence provision ofCal.Const.,art. I, 28, subd. (f)(2), prohibits application of theexclusionary ruleto evidence gathered in violation of state law unless exclusion is compelled by the federal Constitution. Under federal law, the deterrent purpose of theruleis not served by excluding evidence when an officer reasonably acts in objective good faith. If the purpose of theexclusionary ruleis to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional underU.S.4th

Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent that is later overruled is not subject to theexclusionary rule, as suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in those circumstances.

CA(3)[](3) Searches and Seizures 92RemediesSuppression

of EvidenceReviewForfeiture.

Ordinarily, the prosecution cannot justify a search or seizure on appeal on a theory that was not presented to the trial court. This forfeiturerulehas exceptions. Mainly, it does not apply if the considerations that give rise to it are absent. The obvious reason for theruleis to prevent hunch arrests on the street, based on nothing more than confidence that a smart prosecutor will discover a legal basis in the[*1116]courtroom. Thus, a theory that assumes illegal police conduct but nevertheless sustains the search or seizure, such as inevitable discovery, may be raised for the first time on appeal. In addition, the forfeitureruleis inapplicable where there does not appear to be any further evidence

that could have been introduced to defeat the theory in the trial court and therefore the question of application of the new ground to a given set of facts is a question of law.

CA(4)[](4)

Searches and Seizures 87RemediesSuppression of EvidenceGood Faith ExceptionPursuit Misdemeanor.

Under the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendmentexclusionary rule, it was not necessary to suppress evidence from an officer's warrantless entry into defendant's garage after the officer observed defendant blaring loud music and honking unnecessarily and defendant, rather than pulling over, drove up his driveway and into his attached garage. When the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent, theexclusionary ruledoes not apply.

[Erwin et al., Cal. Criminal Defense Practice (2021) ch. 22, 22.03.]

CA(5)[](5) Searches and Seizures 87RemediesSuppression

of EvidenceGood Faith Exception.

The good faith reliance doctrine is objective, fact-based, and limited. Accordingly, the good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal. When undertaking this inquiry, the court presumes responsible law enforcement officers will take care to learn what is required of them under Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform their conduct to theserules. The objective standard requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits. Evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional underU.S.Const.,4thAmend.

Counsel:Peter Goodman for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan and Donna M. Provenzano,

Const.,

Amend.

Const.,

Amend.

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Deputy Attorneys General, and Kimberly M. Castle, Deputy State Solicitor General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Judges:Opinion by Jackson, P. J., with Simons and Burns, JJ., concurring.

Opinion by:Jackson, P. J.Opinion

[*1117]

[**839] JACKSON, P. J.In a nonpublished decision filed October 30, 2019, we affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress evidence filed by defendant Arthur Gregory Lange. (People v. Lange(Oct. 30, 2019, A157169) [nonpub. opn.].) Rejecting defendant's challenge, we held in relevant part that an "'officer's "'hot pursuit'" into the house to prevent the suspect from frustrating the arrest'" is always permissible under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. (Peoplev. Lange, supra,A157169.) After defendant unsuccessfully petitioned the California[**840]Supreme Court for review, the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) granted his petition for writ of certiorari.

On June 23, 2021, our highest court issuedLange v. (2021) 594 U.S. ___ [210486, 141 S.Ct. 2011], holding that the "flight of a[***2]suspected misdemeanant does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home" and that an "officer must consider all the circumstances in a pursuit case to determine whether there is a law enforcement emergency [justifying entry]." (Lange v.supra, 594 U.S. at p. ___ [210at p. 500].) The Supreme Court then vacated our prior decision and transferred this case back to us to reconsider defendant's challenge in light of

its opinion. (Id. at p. ___ [210L.Ed.2dat pp. 500-501.)

To comply with this instruction, we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing addressing the impact of the Supreme Court's new precedent on the issues raised in this appeal. Having considered the parties' supplemental briefs, we again affirm the lower court's order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following brief recitation of facts is taken from our prior, nonpublished opinion (Peoplev. Lange, supra,

) andLange v.California,supra, 594 U.S. ___ [210 486].

I.The Search and Seizure.

About 10:20 p.m. on October 7, 2016, defendant drove past California Highway Patrol Officer Aaron Weikert on a road in Sonoma County. Officer Weikert noticed defendant was blaring loud music and honking unnecessarily, violations ofCode

27007and27001, respectively. (v. Lange, supra,A157169.)

Officer Weikert followed defendant, turning on his overhead lights to signal that defendant should pull over.[***3]Just seconds later, defendant arrived at the[*1118]driveway of his home. Rather than pulling over, defendant drove up his driveway and into his attached garage. Officer Weikert followed defendant into the garage and began questioning him. Defendant appeared intoxicated, prompting the officer to conduct field sobriety tests, which defendant failed. A subsequent blood test showed defendant's blood- alcohol content was over three times the legal limit. (v. Lange, supra,;Lange v.

supra, 594 U.S. at p. ___ [210 at p. 491].) II.The Motion To Suppress.

After defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and operating a vehicle's sound system at excessive levels, he moved to suppress all evidence collected by the officer after he entered defendant's attached garage. (Lange v.

supra, 594 U.S. at p. ___ [210at p. 491].) Defendant argued the officer's warrantless entry violated theFourthAmendment. The prosecution countered that (1) the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for the misdemeanor of failing to comply with a police signal (Veh. Code, 2800, subd. (a)) and (2) the pursuit of a suspected misdemeanant categorically qualified as an exigent circumstance authorizing a warrantless home entry. (Lange v. supra, 594 U.S. at p. ___ [210 at p. 491].)

On May 3, 2017, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. (v. Lange, supra,.) After the appellate division upheld thisruling, he[***4]

[**841]successfully filed a petition to transfer the case to our court. (Ibid.)

III.Appellate Review. A.California Court of Appeal and Supreme Court.

A157169

L.Ed.2d

Vehicle

sections

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As mentioned, our nonpublished opinion affirming the denial of defendant's motion to suppress was filed October 30, 2019. (v. Lange, supra,.) On February 11, 2020, the California Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for review. (Peoplev. Lange, supra, A157169, review den. Feb. 11, 2020, S259560.)

B.United States Supreme Court.

On July 10, 2020, defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. The court granted defendant's petition to resolve the conflict among state and federal courts regarding whether hot pursuit of a suspected misdemeanant categorically qualifies as an exigent circumstance sufficient to permit an officer's warrantless entry into the suspect's home. After the court granted certiorari, the State of California declined to defend the categorical[*1119]ruleadopted by this court. The Supreme Court thus appointed amicus curiae to do so. (Lange v. supra, 594 U.S. at p. ___ [210

at p. 492].)

Following briefing and argument, the Supreme Court rejected a categoricalrulein hot pursuit cases that would permit warrantless entry into the home of a suspected misdemeanant. Instead, the court held that whether a misdemeanor[***5]pursuit "involve[s] exigencies allowing warrantless entry" must "turn[] on the particular facts of the case." (Lange v.

supra, 594 U.S. at p. ___ [210 at p. 491].)

The Supreme Court thus vacated our judgment inv. Lange, supra,, and remanded the case back to us for further proceedings. (Lange v. supra, 594 U.S. at p. ___ [210at pp. 500-501].) Accordingly, in August 2021, we instructed the parties to provide supplemental briefing as to the impact of the high court'srulingon this appeal. We turn

now to the issues raised therein.

DISCUSSION

On remand, the People do not argue in light ofLange v. Californiathat the record established a case-specific exigency that justified the officer's entry into defendant's home. (SeeLange v.supra, 594 U.S. at p. ___ [210at p. 491].) Instead, the People now argue the officer's entry was justified because he acted in reasonable reliance on then binding California appellate precedent (Peoplev. Lloyd (1989) 216Cal.App.3d1425, 1428-1430 [265 Cal. Rptr. 422](Lloyd)) that established a categorical warrant exception for the hot pursuit of misdemeanor suspects. The

People thus assert theexclusionary ruledoes not require suppression of the evidence recovered from defendant's home after the officer's illegal entry. (SeeLange v. supra, 594 U.S. at p. ___ [210

at p. 491].)

Defendant counters that the People forfeited the right to rely on an exception to theexclusionary ruleas a basis for affirming the lower court order by failing to raise it as an issue in the trial[***6]court or in this court when his case first went up on appeal. Alternatively, defendant disputes the People's premise thatLloydqualifies as "binding appellate precedent" authorizing the officer's warrantless entry under the good faith exception.

We begin with the applicable law.

[**842]

I.The Good Faith Exception to theExclusionary Rule.

CA(1)[](1)HN1[] "'In California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional standards.' [Citations.] '"'We defer to the trial court's factual findings,[*1120]express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under theFourthAmendment,we exercise our independent judgment.'"' [Citations.]"v.(2016) 11206, 1212 [211 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 384 P.3d 1189]().)

CA(2)[ ](2)"HN2[ ] Exclusion of evidence due to aFourthviolation is not automatic. ... 'theFourthprotects the right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures," but it is silent about how this right is to be enforced. To supplement the bare text, this Court created theexclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of aFourthAmendmentviolation.' (Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 231-232 [180L.Ed.2d285, 131 S.Ct. 2419](Davis).) 'Therule... operates as "a judicially[***7]created remedy designed to safeguardFourthAmendmentrights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."' (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [82677, 104 S.Ct. 3405](Leon).)" (at pp. 1219-1220.)

Theexclusionary ruleis, however, limited. "[T]he '[t]ruth-in-[e]vidence' provision of theCalifornia Constitution(art. I, 28, subd. (f)(2)[formerly subd. (d)])

People

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California,

L.Ed.2d

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(People

Macabeo

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Amendment

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L.Ed.2d

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Macabeo,

supra, 1

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... prohibits application of theexclusionary ruleto evidence gathered in violation of state law unless exclusion is compelled by the federal Constitution." (v.(2015) 23332, 97 [182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401]().) Under federal law, "[t]he high court has recognized that the deterrent purpose of theruleis not served by excluding evidence when an officer reasonably acts in objective good faith." (supra, 1at p. 1220.) "'"If the purpoof theexclusionary ruleis to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under theFourthAmendment."' (Leon[, supra, 468 U.S.] at p. 919, quotingUnited States v. Peltier (1975) 422 U.S. 531, 542 [45374, 95 S.Ct. 2313].)" (at p. 1220.)

HN3[ ] Thus, the Supreme Court inDavis v. UnitedStates,supra, 564 U.S. 229(Davis), held that "[e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent [that is later overruled] is not subject to theexclusionary rule," as "suppression[***8]would do nothing to deter police misconduct in [those] circumstances . ..." (Id. at pp. 231, 241.) InDavis, because appellate authority specifically authorized the officer's search of the defendant's vehicle, the Supreme Court noted that the "deterrent effect of exclusion ... [could] only be to discourage the officer from '"do[ing] his duty."'" (Id. at p. 241, 1st bracketed insertion added.) Under such circumstances, theexclusionary rulewas not applicable. (Ibid.)

[*1121]

II.The Forfeiture Doctrine Is Not Applicable Here.

CA(3)[ ](3)Applying these principles, we begin by rejecting defendant's claim that the[**843]People forfeited the right to raise the good faith exception as a basis for affirming the lower court's order because they failed to do so until opposing his petition in the Supreme Court.HN4[ ] "Ordinarily, the prosecution cannot justify a search or seizure on appeal on a theory that was not presented to the trial court." (v.

(1994) 2619, 30 [31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 452]

().)

This forfeiturerulehas exceptions. Mainly, it "does not apply if the considerations that give rise to it are absent. 'The obvious reason for th[e]ruleis to prevent "hunch" arrests on the street, based on nothing more than

confidence that a smart prosecutor will discover a legal basis in the courtroom.' [Citation.][***9]Thus, a theory which assumes illegal police conduct but nevertheless sustains the search or seizure, such as inevitable discovery, may be raised for the first time on appeal." (supra, 26 at pp. 30-31.)

That is the case here. Before defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, the People relied on the now invalidated holding inLloyd, supra, 216Cal.App.3d1425, accepted by this court and the trial court, that the search was legal because it followed Officer Weikert's hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant (i.e., defendant). As such, the People were not required to raise the good faith exception as an alternative theory. The good faith exception assumes an illegal search, which the People did not concede in the trial court or when the case was first heard on appeal. (supra, 26 at pp. 30-31.)

HN5[ ] In addition, the forfeitureruleis inapplicable where, as here, "'there does not appear to be any further evidence that could have been introduced to defeat the theory in the trial court and therefore the question of application of the new ground to a given set of facts is a question of law.'"1(Watkins,supra, 26Cal.App.4that p. 31.)

Under these circumstances, we decline to find forfeiture and proceed to the merits.

III.The Good Faith Exception Applies.

The People rely onLloyd, supra, 216Cal.App.3d1425, to argue "binding appellant[***10]precedent" authorized Officer Weikert's warrantless entry into[*1122]defendant's home.Lloydheld that "a suspect may not defeat a detention or arrest which is set in motion in a public place by fleeing to a private place." (Lloyd, supra, at p. 1430.) Further, where "the pursuit into the home was based on an arrest set in motion in a public place, the fact that the offenses justifying the initial detention or arrest were misdemeanors is of no significance in determining the validity of the entry without a warrant." (Ibid.) A few years later, the Fourth Appellate District reached the same result. (SeeIn reLavoyneM. (1990) 221Cal.App.3d154, 159 [270 Cal. Rptr. 394][followingLloydto hold the "hot pursuit of minor into his house to prevent him from frustrating an arrest [for traffic

1We address the lack of a need for further evidencepost, at pages 1123-1124.

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violations that] began in public provides an exception to the warrant requirement"].)2

supra, 594 U.S. at p. ___ [210L.Ed.2dat p. 491].) Nonetheless, at the time Officer Weikert[*1123]entered defendant's home without a warrant,LloydandLavoyneM.were "binding appellate precedent" in

[**844]Inv. Sims (2013) 571 U.S. 3, 9-10 [187L.Ed.2d341,134S.Ct.3](),theSupremeCalifornia.HN6[]Assuch,asthehighcourtinstructs,

Stanton

Stanton

Court expressly acknowledged that the hot pursuit exception in California extended to both felony and misdemeanor suspects, citingLloydandLavoyneM.There, the issue was whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly decided that a California police officer was "'plainly incompetent'" to pursue a fleeing misdemeanant into his home. Reversing, the Supreme Court found it "especially troubling that the Ninth[***11]Circuit would conclude that Stanton was plainly incompetentand subject to personal liability for damagesbased on actions that were lawful according to courts in the jurisdiction where he acted," referring toLloydandLavoyneM.(Stanton,supra, 571 U.S. at pp. 9-10.)

CA(4)[](4)Clearly,Lange v. Californiachanged this California law when it rejected a categoricalrulepermitting warrantless entry in hot pursuit cases involving misdemeanor suspects.3(Lange v.California,

2The People also cite a pre-Lloydcase (People v. Abes (1985) 174Cal.App.3d796, 806-807 [220 Cal. Rptr. 277]) for the position that a "categorical hot pursuit exception applied to misdemeanor offense of being under the influence of PCP." InPeople v. Abes, the officer also had reason to believe there was a PCP lab operating in the home into which the suspect retreated, and that a warrantless entry was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence and to protect public safety. (Ibid.) Nonetheless, the court went on to hold that "if it can be said that Sergeant McCormick had reasonable cause to arrest Luna only for being under the influence of PCP, the fact it was a misdemeanor is of no significance in determining the validity of the entry without a warrant." (Id. at p. 807.)

3Prior toLange v. California, our own Supreme Court expressed a preference for case-by-case assessments rather than categoricalruleswhen undertaking aFourthAmendmentanalysis in a case involving warrantless entry to effect a DUI (driving under the influence) arrest in order to prevent the destruction of blood-alcohol evidence. InPeople v.Thompson(2006) 38 Cal.4th 811, 824 [43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 750, 135 P.3d 3], the California Supreme Court rejected a bright-linerulelimiting warrantless entries to felonies, in part because it "'would send a message to the "bad man" who drinks and drives that a hot pursuit or arrest set in motion can be thwarted by beating the police to one's door.'" The court cautioned, however, that in "holding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry here, we need not decideand do not holdthat the police may enter a home without a warrant to

"when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent, theexclusionary ruledoes not apply." (Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at pp. 249-250; seeMackey,supra, 233Cal.App.4that pp. 94-96[despite the Supreme Court's recent adoption of a new law, "[t]he holding in [Peoplev.

(2001) 94944, 953-956 [114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733],] was ... binding California precedent upon which the police could reasonably rely in 2007, when they installed a GPS device on [defendant's] vehicle"].)

Interestingly,Lloyd, supra, 216Cal.App.3dat pages 1428-1429, relied for its holding onUnited States v. (1976) 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 [49 L. Ed. 2d 300, 96 S. Ct. 2406].held only that an officer can gain warrantless entry into the home of afleeing felonwithout violating theFourthAmendment. "[Although]Santanainvolved a felony suspect, [the Supreme Court] did not expressly limit [its] holding[***12]based on that fact." (supra, 571 U.S. at p. 9; seeLange v. supra, 594 U.S. at p. ___ [210at p. 495]["neithernor any other decision [before today] had resolved the [law regarding warrantless entry[**845]in hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant] one way or the other"].) As such,does not squarely supportLloyd's holding. ((2007) 41Cal.4th139, 155 [59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 157, 158 P.3d 731]["'An appellate decision is not authority for everything said in the court's opinion but only "for the points actually involved and actually decided"'"].) Yet, this fact does not negate the precedential value ofLloydandLavoyneM., which remained good law in California until the Supreme Court decidedLange v. California. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.SuperiorCourt (1962) 57 Cal.2d

450, 455 [20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].)

Moreover, relying on this now invalidated appellate precedent to apply the good faith exception in this case fully aligns with the policies underlying our Supreme CourtFourthAmendmentjurisprudence. "A police officer who acts in compliance with binding judicial precedent is 'not culpable in any way.' (Davis v. UnitedStates,supra, 564 U.S. at [pp. 239-240].) If theexclusionary rulewere applied in that context, it would

effect an arrest of a DUI suspect ineverycase. We hold merely that the police conduct here, taking into account all of the circumstances, was reasonable ... ." (Id. at p. 827.)

Zichwic

Cal.App.4th

Santana

Santana

Stanton,

California,

L.Ed.2d

Santana

Santana

People

v.

Knoller

Page 9 of 9

72 Cal. App. 5th 1114, *1123;287 Cal. Rptr. 3d 837, **845;2021 Cal. App. LEXIS 1071, ***12

deter 'conscientious police work,' not police misconduct." (supra, 233at p. 95, citingDavis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 241.)

[*1124]

Defendant counters there is no evidence in this record to establish Officer Weikert was even aware ofLloydorLavoyneM., much less that he relied on them when deciding to enter defendant's home without a warrant. According to defendant, had the[***13]People raised this issue in a timely fashion, he would have been on fair notice of the need to investigate the officer's familiarity with these cases.

HN7[]CA(5)[](5)Defendant's arguments misstate the law. "[The good faith reliance] doctrine is objective, fact-based, and limited. 'Accordingly, our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal ... .'" (Macabeo,supra, 1Cal.5that pp. 1221-1222.) When undertaking this inquiry, we presume "[r]esponsible law-enforcement officers will take care to learn 'what is required of them' underFourthAmendmentprecedent and will conform their conduct to theserules. [Citation.]" (Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 241; seeUnited States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 919-920 & fn. 20["The objective standard we adopt ... requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits"].)

HN8[ ] Under these principles, "'"evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge,or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under theFourthAmendment."' (Leon[, supra, 468 U.S.] at p. 919[citation].)" (at p. 1220, italics added.) Here, Officer Weikert may not properly be charged with knowledge that his warrantless entry into defendant's home violated theFourthAmendment[***14]given that multiple California casesgood law at the timeauthorized warrantless entry in cases, such as this one, involving the hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant. (SeeMacabeo,supra, 1Cal.5that p. 1212[reviewing court exercises its independent judgment on the trial court's express and implied factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence].)

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we conclude the officer "followed binding state appellate law when he entered the garage in pursuit of [defendant] ... ." Theexclusionary ruletherefore does not require[**846]

exclusion of the evidence seized in defendant's home, even though under the new law established inLange v. supra, 594 U.S. at page ___ [210at pages 500-501], seizure of this evidence was a

violation of hisFourthAmendmentrights.[*1125]

DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant's motion to suppress is affirmed.

Simons, J., and Burns, J., concurred.

End of Document

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