Player 2 e g h a 0, 0 3,5 1, 6 -3, 3 b x, y 0, 7 4, y 10, 5 Player 1 C X, 3 4, 0 2, 1 -4, -2 d -2, 4 0, 5 0, 7 -7,3 Consider the payoff matrix above, and answer the following questions about this game. a) (0.5 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 3. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? b) (0.5 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 3. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? c) (1 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 3. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? d) (0.5 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? e) (0.5 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? f) (1 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 10. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game