Please answer question 2. thanks!

8:39 { ? - 25 % BADM 560 - FIRM ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY PROBLEM SET THREE QUESTIONS 1. Find the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) in the following simultaneous-move, one-shot games. The payoffs for Player A are on the left and the payoffs for Player B are on the right. a Player B Left Right Up 2,4 3,5 Player A Down 1,4 h. Player B Left Right Up 1,1 3,0 Player A Down 0,3 2,2 Player B Left Right Up 2.4 6,5 Player A Down 3,6 1,4 2. Two firms are engaged in undifferentiated products price competition. There are 10,000 people in the population, cach of whom is willing to pay at most 10 for at most one unit of the food. Currently, both firms can produce as many units as they want to for each. a. ? a. What is the equilibrium in this market? What are the firms' profits? b. Suppose that one firm can adopt a new technology that allows it to produce as many units as it wants to for 3 each. What is the equilibrium now? How much would this firm be willing to pay for the new technology? Suppose that the new technology mentioned in part b. is available to both firms. The cost to a firm of purchasing this technology is 10,000. The game is now played in two stages. First, the firms simultaneously decide whether to adopt the new technology or not. Then, in the second stage, the firms set prices simultaneously. Assume that each firm knows whether or not its rival acquired the new technology when choosing its prices. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium equilibrial of this game? (HINT: You can solve this problem by drawing a single normal-form game that incorporates both the first and second period payoffs