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Question 8 1 pts Consider the strategic interaction between Coles and Woolworths considering entering and establishing a store in a country town. Coles gets to make its decision first. It can Enter (E) or Not Enter (NE). This choice is observed by Woolworths that then chooses either E or NE. If both firms opt for E they each get -5. If both choose NE, the payoff to each is 5. If Coles opts for E and Woolworths NE Coles gets 20 and Woolworths O. Conversely, if Coles goes NE and Woolworths E, Woolworths gets 20 and Coles O. If possible, in this strategic environment, you would prefer to be because there is a O Coles; first-mover advantage. O Woolworths; first-mover advantage. O Coles; second-mover advantage. O Woolworths; second-mover advantage. O either Coles or Woolworths; either first-mover or second-mover advantage. Question 27 1 pts Boral can choose to Enter (E) a market or not (N). This choice is observed by its rival, CSR, who can then choose either to E or N. If the actions are (E, E), where the first action is Boral's and the second is CSR's, the payoffs are (25, 10), where the first payoff accrues to Boral and the second to CSR. If the actions are (E, N) the payoffs are (20, 30). If the actions are (N, E) is (x, 20). If the actions (N, N) the payoffs are (30, 15). In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibria, what is the largest payoff (in whole numbers) to Boral following the choice of (N, E) by itself and its rival for which the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium involves Boral choosing E? O 14 O 19 O 24 O 29 O 34