Please answer the following question:

2. Consider the following version of the Prisoner's dilemma game: Silent (2) Fink (2) Silent (1) 2, 2 -1, 3 Fink (1) 3,-1 1, 1 The first payoff is that of player 1 and the second that of player 2. (a) What are the Nash Equilibria (if any) in the simultaneous game? Explain (b) If the game is repeated infinitely, what is the Nash Equilibrium? Compute the discount factor required for the players to cooperate in this infinitely repeated game. (c) If player 1 moves first, what is normal form of the sequential game? (d) What are the Nash Equilibria in this sequential version? (e) Draw the extensive form in this sequential version and identify the proper subgames. (f) What is the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium in this sequential version? Explain