Please answer the following question!

Consider the following extensive game. Suppose an incumbent (rm 1) makes an investment K in the rst period, which is observed by a potential entrant (rm 2). In the second period, rm 2 decides whether to enter the industry and must pay a xed cost F if it chooses to enter. If rm 2 enters, the two rms then play a Cournot game where they simultaneously set quantities. If rm 2 does not enter, rm 1 remains a monopolist. Demand is given by p = K ql qz. Assume zero marginal cost of production. The cost to the incumbent of . . . K3 making an investment K 1s ? . (1)What K does the incumbent choose if entry is blockaded? For what F is entry blockaded? (2) What K does the incumbent choose if it deters entry? (3)Does the investment make the incumbent soft or tough? When deterring entry, does the incumbent overinvest or underinvest in K? (4) What K does the incumbent choose if it accommodates entry? (5) For What values of F will the incumbent deter entry? For what values of F will the incumbent accommodate entry? (You don't need to solve for F explicitly. Simply write down the inequality condition, and clearly state the direction of the inequality for each outcome.) (6) Does the incumbent overinvest or underinvest when accommodating entry