Please answer the question

Teens A and B are smitten with each other but neither knows of the other's feelings. Suppose the teachers at their school organize a dance. The "payoff" is based on whether their advances are rebuffed or accepted. If they both Declare, they get positive utility but if they are Rebuffed they face humiliation $($significantly negative payoff$).$ Rebuffing an advance slightly elevates the teen's standing with peers.

What is a teen's dominant strategy?

a$)$ Declare.

b$)$ Choose at random.

c$)$ Rebuff$/$Ignore$.$

d$)$ No dominant strategy.

$14.$ Two hunters decide whether to go after a stag, which requires both to bring down successfully, or a hare, which each can do individually. The payoff matrix for the simultaneous$-$move version of this game is shown in the below graph. Which of the following is the most complete list of Nash equilibria of this game?

Hunter B

$\backslash$table$[[,$Stag$],[$Hunter $A,$Stag$],[$Hare$]],$

$\backslash$table$[[10,10,0,5],[5,0,5,5]]$

a$)$ Hunters A and B play Stag.

b$)$ Hunters A and B play Hare.

c$)$ There are two: in one, the hunters play Stag; in the other, the hunters play Hare.

d$)$ There are three: both play Stag, both play Hare, and one other equilibrium in mixed strategies.

$15.$ Continue with question $14.$ Suppose the game were played sequentially with A moving first, $B$ observing $A^{\text{'}}$ s action, and then moving second. What are the dimensions of the new payoff matrix representing this sequential game?

a$)$ Two rows for A$\text{'}$s strategies and four column's for B$\text{'}$s contingent strategies

b$)$ Four rows and four columns

c$)$ Four rows for A$\text{'}$s contingent strategies and two for B$\text{'}$s

d$)$ The modeler has some choice in how to represent the sequential game.