Please explain part b only, how can the hawk have a dominant strategy in the bracket section, thanks!

Q5. Consider the following general form of the hawk-dove game: there is a resource of value V; if two doves meet, they will split the resource. If a hawk and a dove meet, then the hawk will take the entire resource; if two hawks meet, then they will ght; the loser of the hawk fight pays a cost C, and the winner gets the resource V (each hawk expects to win with probability 5 0%). a) b) Write down the payoff matrix for this game (use the expected payoff for hawks) The easiest payoffs are those in the top right and bottom left corresponding to hawk, dove and dove, hawk. in these cases, the player being a hawk gets the whole payoff V while the dove gets nothing. When both players are doves, they split the resource and get VIZ each [bottom right]. The top left is when both players ght. On average, they'll win half of their fights, and so half the time they'll get V and half the time thel pay a cost C, so the average payoff from this strategy is (V C)/2. PIayerZ hawk dove Player hawk [v-cy2.(v-c)/2 dove What assumptions on the values V8: C are necessary to ensure that this is truly a hawk-dove game (i.e. to ensure that the players do not have dominant strategies)? C >V : lfthis were not the case (so that, e.g. V :> C then players would nd hawk to be a dominant strategy (i.e. it would always give a higher payoff than clove]. Given the assumptions from part (b), what is the equilibrium proportion of hawks (h) in the population? if the proportion of hawks in the population is h, and the proportion of doves is d (where d = 1 h], then we can express the payoffs to playing hawk [PH] against a random opponent, or playing dove [Pd] against a random opponent as: Pa = (n) (T) + (1 hm Pd = (mm) +