Please explain this part. Be concise and straight to the point !

Section 4). There is overwhelming evidence that nearly all fund man- agers underperform market average indices once operational costs are deducted (Malkiel, 2013). Taken as a whole, these disconnects between different aspects of financial market "efficiency" imply that the conventional digital plat- form pattern of disrupting industries by simultaneously boosting all aspects of market efficiency, in a complementary manner, is unlikely to find much purchase in finance. Rather, platforms are likely to operate asymmetrically on different aspects of efficiency. Just as striking as the parallels between the informational intensity of the digital platform economy, and finance as traditionally structured, are their parallel organizational and geographic fluidity. The activities of financial firms, like digital platform providers, are enormously con- sequential for the "real" economy. However, the products directly provided by both are mostly constituted, in a literal sense, of abstract textual and numerical "code." Of primary importance in finance are private contracts (Haberly and Wojcik, 2017a; Knuth and Potts, 2015; Pistor, 2013). Like software, these contracts can, at least in common- law based systems, be crafted in almost unlimited innovative ways so long as they remain within the bounds of public law and reg- ulation-which are themselves mutable via choice of jurisdictional arena and political lobbying. The result is a deep structural common- ality between the dialectics of legal-regulatory innovation/avoidance/ mobility, and state regulatory response, in finance and cyberspace (Ferri and Minsky, 1992; Lessig, 2006); however a commonality in which Silicon Valley, for all of its recent controversies, is an amateur when compared to Wall Street or The City. The question this raises is whether the emergence of a new financial technological architecture will have any impact on the basic logic of this dialectic of regulatory avoidance and reaction, or simply define a new chapter in an old story. Crucially, none of these questions can be addressed in a geographic vacuum. As financial geographers have long observed, the informa- tional efficiency of financial markets must be generated by the human and material apparatus of financial centers (Cook et al., 2007; Wojcik, 2011; Zook and Grote, 2017). The key question is how the "old" human-relational informational geography of finance will interact with its increasingly important "new" virtual informational geography-and just as importantly, the geography of behind-the-scenes technicians who craft its algorithms. Similarly, geographers (e.g. Roberts, 1994; Coe et al., 2014; Haberly and Wojcik, 2017a; Knuth and Potts, 2015) have long emphasized that the abstract legal-regulatory dimension of finance must be structured through real places-even if only law offices housing the documentation of "brass plate" companies. In this respect, the key question is how this "paper" geography of finance will interact with the growing importance of its "virtual" geography. Addressing these questions requires an analytical framework that conceptualizes the evolution of financial geographies in terms of the intersection of multiple, qualitatively different geographic logics, rather than simply an overarching logic of financial center agglomeration. The outline of such an approach is provided by the Global Financial Network (GFN) framework introduced by Coe et al. (2014), which conceptualizes the geography of finance as a multidimensional logic of financial center specialization across different functional spheres. As has been widely acknowledged (see Topfer, 2018; Wojcik, 2018), this framework is something of an initial sketch, which requires elaboration to be fully operationalized. Consequently, in Fig. 1, we outline an ex- panded GFN approach to conceptualizing the geographic evolution of FinTech. In contrast to Coe et al.'s "2D"-framework, this problematizes financial geographies in terms of the four-pronged interactions between what we dub the "relational," "virtual," "technical," and "paper" geo- graphies of finance. Each sphere has its own logic of centripetal and centrifugal processes-both internally and in relation to other spher- es-which are seen as combining to condition the role and formation of particular financial centers. Implicit in this framework is the potential for a technology-enabled centrifugal unbundling of the geography of finance. In the most extreme