Please give me the detailed process.

2. A search engine has three positions to sell. The positions receive 300, 200 and 100 clicks per day, respectively. There are three advertisers, with per-click values $10, $7, and $2. If bidder obtains position 3' and pays p per click, his payoff will be 2:}- (v, p), where v, is the bidder's value per click, I,- is the number of clicks it gets, and p is the price per click. (a) Find the lowest market clearing prices for the three positions, with prices stated as dollars per click. (13) Suppose the search engine runs a generalized second price (GSP) auction. Find Nash equilibrium bids that leads to the prices paid in part (a). (c) Find the highest market clearing prices for the three positions, with prices stated as dollars per click. (d) Suppose the search engine implements a reserve price of $1 per click. Find the lowest market clearing prices once this reserve price is imposed. What prices are affected by the use of the reserve prices