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Question 5 [25 marks] Consider the following three-player simultaneous-move game where (i) each player i E {1, 2, 3} has two pure strategies 3,- = {Soft} and (ii) the i-th element in each cell is player is payoff for each i E {1,2,3}. For each playerz' E {1, 2, 3}, let {p,,1 pi) be player i's mixed strategy where 30,; E [0,1] is the probability assigned to s, (and thus 1 p,- is assigned to t,). Player 3 (a) Find one Nash equilibrium. You need to show your work. [15 marks] (b) Other than the one you showed in (a), is there any other Nash equilibrium? Dis- cuss. [10 marks]