please help.

3 Asymmetric information (separating equilibrium) Consider a community of individuals with different probabilities of falling ill. Individuals of type H have a probability of falling ill of p\" = 0.6. These individuals form 3/4 of the population. Individuals of type L. the remaining 1/4 of the population. have a probability of falling ill of p1" = 0.2. Any individual who is ill suffers an income loss of 200. 1. Assume there is symmetric information. What is the actuarially fair premium for each group to insure against illness? What level of coverage will each individual request if oercd insurance at the actuarially fair premium? 2. Assume there is asymmetric irrwmation and rm cannot distinguish be- tween the types. The same insurance contract must be offered to all individuals. If the contract is to earn an expected prot of zero. what premium must be charged? 3. Is it possible for a rm to offer an alternative contract that is protable when the contract in part 2 is available