... Please help. Advanced microeconomics

4. (30 points) Consider the following game. There are ten dollars to divide. Two players are each required to simultaneously name an integer between 0 and 10. The player who names the higher number gets to keep the money. If they name the same number, the money is equally shared between them. (a) Describe the set of players N, the set of strategies { Silien, and the payoff function QuitiEN. (b) Are there strategies that are strictly dominated? Demonstrate your reasoning. What are the resulting strategies after iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? (c) Find the best responses (correspondence) for each player. That is, find the strategies that maximize a player's payoff given what the other player does. (d) Find the Nash equilibria of the game. (e) Suppose now the game is changed. Whenever there is a tie, each player receives nothing. Answer the same questions in parts (b) and (c). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game.1. (20 points) Consider the Bertrand duopoly model with homogeneous products, Suppose that the quantity that consumers demand from i is a - pi when pi p,. and (a-p.)/2 when p. = p. Suppose also that there are no fixed costs and that marginal costs are constant at c, where c