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D Question 3 6 pts Consider the following sequential game between firm 1 and firm 2: First, firm 1 decides to either adopt an aggressive marketing strategy or not. Second, Firm 2 observes firm 1's decision and then also decides between its own aggressive strategy, a passive strategy or whether to leave the market altogether. The profits (in millions of dollars) of the firms are as follows: If both adopt an aggressive strategy, then firm 1's payoff is $14 and firm 2's is -$1. If firm 1 adopts an aggressive strategy and firm 2 does not, then the payoff for firm 1 is $19 and for firm 2 is -$5. If firm 1 does nothing and firm 2 adopts an aggressive strategy, firm 1's payoff is $10 and firm 2's is $9. If both do nothing, then firm 1 makes $18 in profits and firm 2 makes $5. Finally, if firm 2 leaves the market altogether, it makes $0 and firm 1 makes $20 with an aggressive strategy and $24 without one. 1. Using the principle of backward induction, the mos. reasonable prediction is that [ Select ] Now assume that Firm 2 has the chance of preempting Firm 1's move. That is, firm 2 has the opportunity to publicly commit to its strategy (of being aggressive, passive or leaving) before firm 1 decides what to do. 2. Then firm 2 should [ Select ]