please help find equilibrium. perhaps Bayes' rule would be best for this problem.

5. Consider the job-market signaling game represented in the extensive form below. 11, 10 m m 9. 10 F N WH E F i(r ) (g) 4. 4 H C (1/2) 2.4 11, -1 m L (1/2) 3. - 1 i(1-F) (1-7) N WL E 4.4 C , 4 This is similar to the examples we considered in class. The worker is high ability with probability 1/2 and is low ability with probability 1/2. The high ability worker bears a cost of 4 to obtain an education, and the low ability worker bears a cost of 7. (a) Describe a signaling equilibrium in which the high-ability worker ob- tains an education and the low-ability worker does not. (b) Describe a pooling equilibrium in which both types of worker do not obtain an education