Please help me solve this

Please answer each of the following questions related to the attached normal-form game. (1) What is the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of the stage game? (2) What is Pl's minmax strategy? (3) What does P2 receive when P1 plays its minmax strategy? {4] What is P2's minmax strategy? (5) What does P1 receive when P2 plays its minrnax strategy? (6) Suppose the stage game is played twice [T = 2). How large does 8 need to be to get P1 to cooperate on playing 51 = c in the rst time period (t = 1)? (7) Suppose the stage game is played twice (T = 2}. How large does A need to be to get P2 to cooperate on playing 52 = y in the first time period (t = 1)? (8) Suppose the stage game is played T times (T > 2]. Further, suppose that B = 5. How many rounds must be played to induce P1 to cooperate in the rst round? (9) Suppose that e = it = 5 and that the game is innitely repeated. Let the discount factor be 6. For which values of 5 will P1 and P2 cooperate on in every round? \f