Question: Please help Question 11 3 pts Consider a Stackelberg game of quantity competition between two firms. Firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is
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Question 11 3 pts Consider a Stackelberg game of quantity competition between two firms. Firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is the follower. Market demand is described by the inverse demand function P=1000-4Q. Each firm has a constant unit cost of production equal to 20. What is the profit of the leader? O 17,455.25 19,600 O 28,922.5 O 30,012.5 Question 12 3 pts Consider a Stackelberg game of quantity competition between two firms. Firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is the follower. Market demand is described by the inverse demand function P=1000-4Q. Each firm has a constant unit cost of production equal to 20. What is the profit of the follower? O 15,006.25 O 24,570.5 O 12,700 O 18,524.5Question 13 Consider a Stackelberg game of quantity competition between two rms. Firm 1 is the leader and rm 2 is the follower. Market demand is described by the inverse demand function P21-4Q. Each rm has a constant unit cost of production equal to 20. Suppose rm 2's unit cost of production is cs2. What would c have to be so that in the Nash equilibrium the two rms, leader and follower, had the same market share? 01o Do Q Impossible, as it would have to be negative. (316
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