Please help with Qa

2. Consider a game where players 1 and 2 must independently decide whether to grab or yield, and their utility payoffs (u1, u2) depend on their actions as follows: Player 1 \\ Player 2 2 grabs 2 yields 1 grabs -2, -2 8, t2 1 yields t1, 8 t1, t2 Each player's payoff t; from yielding has been left unspecified in the above table, so that we can consider some different assumptions about it in parts (a) and (b) below. If each player i privately knows his or her payoff t; from yielding, we may call it the player's type. (a) Suppose first that t = to = 0, and this fact is common knowledge among the players. Find all Nash equilibria of this game. For each Nash equilibrium, compute the expected payoff for each player. (b) Now Suppose that t and to are independent random variables, each drawn from a Uniform distribution on the interval from 0 to 1. When they decide whether to grab or yield, each player i privately knows his or her payoff to from yielding, which we may call it the player's type. Find a Bayesian equilibrium in which, for each player, some types would grab but other types would yield