Question: Please refer to the attachment: Problem 4 (7 points) Consider the game (N, v) given by N = {1, 2, 3} and v : 2

 Please refer to the attachment: Problem 4 (7 points) Consider thegame (N, v) given by N = {1, 2, 3} and v: 2 - R, defined by 0, K=0 "(N) = 1, KE{{},(3)) 2, KE {{2), (1.3} , (1. 2). (2.3} } 3, KE

Please refer to the attachment:

{1,2.3 } Calculate the Shapley payoffs for all players! Hint: Players 1and 3 are symmetric.Problem 6 (7 points) Show the market clearence theorem:If p > > 0 and all markets but one are cleared,all markets are cleared! Assume: p . T' = p . w'

Problem 4 (7 points) Consider the game (N, v) given by N = {1, 2, 3} and v : 2 - R, defined by 0, K=0 "(N) = 1, KE{{}, (3)) 2, KE {{2), (1.3} , (1. 2). (2.3} } 3, KE {1,2.3 } Calculate the Shapley payoffs for all players! Hint: Players 1 and 3 are symmetric.Problem 6 (7 points) Show the market clearence theorem: If p > > 0 and all markets but one are cleared, all markets are cleared! Assume: p . T' = p . w' for every consumer i E N (Wales' low)!Problem 5 (10 points) Consider the following two person game! Calculate all equilibria in pure and properly mixed strategies! Illustrate both reaction functions graphically! player 2 A B 3, 2 3.0 player 1 D 0. 4 4.5Problem 8 (6 points) Consider the production of two goods A and B with input factors capital (() and labour (1) and with marginal rates of technical substitution = MRTS obeying MRTSA =7 >3 = MRTSB. Show that this situation is not efficient by pointing to a Pareto- improving factor reallocation

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