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Question 3 Consider the following oligopolistic market. In the first stage, Firm 1 chooses quantity q1 . Firms 2 and 3 observe Firm 1's choice, and then Not yet answered proceed to simultaneously choose q2 and q3 , respectively. Marked out of Market demand is given by p(Q) = 100 - Q, and @ = q1 + q2 + q3 . Firm 1's costs are ci(91 ) = 191, firm 2's costs are c2(92) = 292 and 2.50 firm 3's costs are c3(93) = 293. Flag Starting from the end of the game, you can express Firm 2's best response function in terms of q1 and q3 , and you can similarly express question Firm 3's best response function in terms of q1 and q2 . Using these, answer the following questions. a) (0.5 point) If Firm 1 chooses q1 = 9, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? b) (0.5 point) If Firm 1 chooses q1 = 100, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? c) (1 point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 1 produces what quantity? d) (0.5 point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 2 and firm 3 each produce what quantity