Please show the work to help with studying, thanks a lot

Suppose the following finitely repeated game G(7, 6) where the stage game is: 1/2 X Y Z X 6, 6 2, 7 2, 5 Y 9,3 5, 6 2, 3 Z 5, 2 4, 2 3, 3 and where we assume that 6 = 1. (a) Specify the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the stage game. (b) Let T = 2. Is there a subgame perfect equilibrium that allows {X, X } to be played in any period? Carefully specify such a strategy, if it exists. (c) Supposed instead that 7 = 3. Can {X, X } be part of a subgame perfect equilib rium in this case? Carefully specify such a strategy, if it exists