Please show your work. Where there are explanations, justify your answer. 1. Consider a game with two players, player 1 and player 2. Player 1 has the possible actions: A and B. Player 2 has the possible actions: C and D. a. If this is a static game, give an example strategy for player 1 and an example strategy for player 2. b. Now assume this is a sequential game with player 1 going first and player 2 moving second (and then the game ends). Give an example of a strategy for player 1 and an example for player 2. c. Now assume this is a repeated game (so, the stage game is the same as (a.)). The game is played twice. Give an example of a strategy for player 1 and an example of a strategy for player 2. 2. Two players are playing the stage game below. P1/P2 C D C 3,3 0,4 D 4,0 2,2 ' 1. Suppose this game is player 78 times. Consider the following strategy for both players: Play C in every round except the last round. Play D in the last round. If, in any round before the last round a player does not player C, play D until the game ends. Is this a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? 2. Assume both players discount future payoffs with the usual per-period discount factor . Are there values of 4 that can sustain the outcome (C,C) at every stage of the game? If so, solve for 4. If not, explain why not. 3. Go back to the players playing this game 78 times. Create a third action for both players and the corresponding payoffs to sustain the strategy asserted in (a.). Show why this will be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (that means show they won't deviate, use the payoffs to do this)