Please solve Question 1 and 2 for me.

ECO2003F: Tutorial 5 Submission due: 26 April 2024 (by noon) Please see announcement by Head Tutor regarding submission procedures. Question 1. (20 marks) If market demand is given by P = 48 4(Q, and total cost for a given firm is given by TC =50+ 12Q, then assuming firms are identical and produce undifferentiated products, solve for, the profit maximising equilibrium for market structure characterised by: Perfect competition Pure monopoly Cournot duopoly Stackelberg duopoly Bertrand duopoly (15) Compare and contrast the outcomes under each of these from the perspective of consumer welfare. (5) Question 2. (15 marks) Consider a firm with marginal private costs (MPC) givenby MPC = 5Q + 250 and marginal external costs (MEC) of noise which affects the firm's neighbours given by MEC = 5Q. The firm has unrestricted rights to produce whatever quantity of its goods, using whatever tools it chooses. Assume the market price for the firm's goods is R1,000. a) Calculate the Pareto Efficient and Pareto Inefficient quantities of goods produced by the firm. (6) b) Consider a situation in which the firm and the neighbours can use private bargaining to achieve the Pareto Efficient quantity of production. Using the quantities in your answer above, graphically illustrate the welfare implications of bargaining for the firm, the neighbours, and society overall. Make sure to fully label your diagram. (5) Now assume that the firm's neighbours have the right to silence. Explain whether this would affect the Pareto Efficient and Pareto Inefficient quantities of the firm's production. (4)