please solve this

3. Player 1 is a company choosing whether to enter a market or stay out; If 1 stays out, the payoff to both players is (0, 3). Player 2 is already in the market and chooses (simultaneously) whether to fight player 1 if there is entry. The payoffs to player 2 depend whether 2 is a normal player (with prob 1-p) or an aggressive player (with prob p). Aggressive Fight Not Enter -1,2 2-1 Out 0.3 0,3 Normal Fight Not Enter -1,0 1,2 Out 0,3 |0,3 Player 2 knows if he/she is normal or aggressive, and player 1 doesn't know. If player 2 uses a strategy of fight when aggressive and not when normal, what is true about player 1's expected utility? O It is -1 when 1 chooses to enter; O It is 1-2p when 1 chooses to enter; O It is 1-2p when 1 chooses to be out; O It is -1 when 1 chooses to be out