Please type the answer by the computer, so I can see it clearly, thank you!!!!

consider a two-player game between child's play and kid's korner, each of which produces and sells wooden swing sets for children. each player can set either a high or a low price for a standard two-swing, one slide set. If they both set a high price, each receives profits of $64,000 per year. If one sets a low price and the other sets a high price, the low-price firm earns profits of $72,000 per year, while the high-price firm earns $20,000. If they both set a low price, each receives profits of $57,000.

(a) Suppose that the two firms play this game repeatedly forever. Let each of them use a grim-trigger strategy in which they both price high unless one of them "defects," in which case they price low for the rest of the game. what is the one-time gain from defecting against an opponent playing such a strategy? how much does each firm lose, in each future period, after it defect once? If r = 0.25will it be worthwhile for them to cooperate? find the range of value of r for which this strategy is able to sustain cooperation between the two firms.

(b) Suppose now that the firms know there is a 10% probability that one of them may go bankrupt in any given year. If bankruptcy occurs, the repeated game between the two firms ends. will this knowledge change the firm's actions when r = 0.25? what if the probability increase to 35% in any year?

(or 8 = 0.8) (or :)