pls provide a step by step solution

Exercise 10.1-4: Sealed High-Bid Auction with Two Identical Items for Sale There are three buyers. The support of each buyer's value is [0, B] and the p.d.f. of the buyers' values is ((0,)/(02)/(0;). Each buyer values only one item. Buyers submit sealed bids. The two highest bids are the winning bids, and each winner pays his own bid. (a) Show that buyer i, with value 0;, has one of the two highest values with probability 2F(0,) - F(0.)? (b) Hence argue that, in a symmetric equilibrium, the slope of buyer i's equilibrium payoff function is #(@) =2F(@) - FG). (c) Hence solve for the equilibrium bid function. (d) Generalize your answer to the n-buyer case