Question: Position Auctions 18 2 points Consider a standard position auction. There are two positions: Suppose that bidders are bidding their true values, i.e.: Top (T)

 Position Auctions 18 2 points Consider a standard position auction. Thereare two positions: Suppose that bidders are bidding their true values, i.e.:Top (T) and Bottom (B). Positions receive the following number of clickper day bl : 9) b2 : 6, 133 : 3; b4: 2- 33T : 300, $3 = 100 Verify whether such biddingconstitutes an equilibrium of the GSP There are four bidders (B1-B4) withthe following dollar values per auction. To do 50' identify all playersllf any} who can protably gain click: from deviating. 31 9 92_ 5 v3 _ 3 v4 _ 2 Hint: Drag "Nobody" ifyou think that nobody cangain from deviation and _ a _ a_ 3 - this bidding profile is an equilibrium of the GSP

auction. Players who can gain from deviating No Answers Chosen Possible answersNobody B2 BS B1 B4 19 3 points Suppose that bidders arebidding b1 = 4, b2 = 3, b3 = 2, b4 =2. Verify whether such bidding constitutes an equilibrium of the GSP auction.To do so, identify all players (if any) who can profitably gainfrom deviating. Hint: Drag "Nobody" if you think that nobody can gainfrom deviation and this bidding profile is an equilibrium of the GSPauction. Players who can gain from deviating No Answers Chosen Possible answersB2 Nobody B3 B1 B42 points Consider a Vickrey auction. Assuming thatall players use their dominant strategy, calculate the Vickrey payment for Bidder1 Type your answer... 2 points Consider a Vickrey auction. Assuming that

Position Auctions 18 2 points Consider a standard position auction. There are two positions: Suppose that bidders are bidding their true values, i.e.: Top (T) and Bottom (B). Positions receive the following number of click per day bl : 9) b2 : 6, 133 : 3; b4 : 2- 33T : 300, $3 = 100 Verify whether such bidding constitutes an equilibrium of the GSP There are four bidders (B1-B4) with the following dollar values per auction. To do 50' identify all players llf any} who can protably gain click: from deviating. 31 9 92 _ 5 v3 _ 3 v4 _ 2 Hint: Drag "Nobody" if you think that nobody cangain from deviation and _ a _ a _ 3 - this bidding profile is an equilibrium of the GSP auction. Players who can gain from deviating No Answers Chosen Possible answers Nobody B2 BS B1 B4 19 3 points Suppose that bidders are bidding b1 = 4, b2 = 3, b3 = 2, b4 = 2. Verify whether such bidding constitutes an equilibrium of the GSP auction. To do so, identify all players (if any) who can profitably gain from deviating. Hint: Drag "Nobody" if you think that nobody can gain from deviation and this bidding profile is an equilibrium of the GSP auction. Players who can gain from deviating No Answers Chosen Possible answers B2 Nobody B3 B1 B42 points Consider a Vickrey auction. Assuming that all players use their dominant strategy, calculate the Vickrey payment for Bidder 1 Type your answer... 2 points Consider a Vickrey auction. Assuming that all players use their dominant strategy, calculate the Vickrey payment for Bidder 2 Type you r answer... 2 points Consider a Vickrey auction. Assuming that all players use their dominant strategy, calculate the Vickrey payment for Bidder 3 Type your answer... 2 points Find the lowest per click marketclearing price for the Bottom (B) position PB Instructions: Round your answer to 2 decimal places (for exampie, 1/3 is 0.33, 1/2 is 0.5 and 2/3 is 0.67). Type you r answer... 2point5 5 Find the lowest per click marketclearing price for the Top (T) position PT Instructions: Round your answer to 2 decimai places (for example, 1/3 is 0.33, 1/2 is 0.5 and 2/3 is 0.67). Type your answer... 2 points Find the lowest possible revenue in the GSP auction. Type your answer... 2 points Find the highest per click marketclearing price for the Bottom (B) position PB Instructions: Round your answer to 2 decimal places (for exampie, 1/3 is 0.33, 1/2 is 0.5 and 2/3 is 0.67). Type your answer... 2 points } Find the highest per click marketclearing price for the Top (Ti position PT Instructions: Round your answer to 2 decimal places (for example, 1/3 is 0.33, 1/2 is 0.5 and 2/3 is 0.67). Type your answer... 2points Find the highest possible revenue in the GSP auction. Type your

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