Principal$-$agent and property rights theory both predict potential incentive alingment and entrenchment problems of $($inside$)$ majority investors. What does this mean? Choose the $2$ most appropriate definitions & examples.

The entrenchment problem refers to the risk that managers who are not related to the majority investor will be able to remain within the firm, even if they are making poor decisions.

The$$entrenchment problem refers to the fact that managers who exploit the firm for their own benefit or make poor business decisions cannot easily be forced to leave if there are no blockholders amongst the shareholders who take responsibility to monitor and control management.

The incentive alignment problem refers to the fact that minority investors often do not have a good understanding of the firm and might therefore try to get management to pursue short$-$sighted $($myopic$)$ policies.

The$$entrenchment problem refers to the fact that managerial blockholders who exploit the firm for their own benefit or make poor business decisions cannot easily be controlled or dismissed.

The incentive alignment problem refers to the possibility that majority shareholders might have different preferences than minority investors, e$.$g$.$ majority investors might want to benefit other firms they have investments in $("$related party transactions"$),$ or they might want to appoint unquyalified family members to managerial positions $("$nepotism$")$ whereas minority shareholders tend to want managers to maximise the long$-$term value of the firm.

The incentive alignment problem refers to the possibility that majority shareholders might have different preferences than minority investors, e$.$g$.$ majority investors tend to be much more risk happy than minority shareholders.