Question: Problem 3. Suppose that the spy can communicate only by carrier pigeon. Suppose that the spy sends a message Position A if the enemy

Problem 3. Suppose that the spy can communicate only by carrier pigeon. 

Problem 3. Suppose that the spy can communicate only by carrier pigeon. Suppose that the spy sends a message "Position A" if the enemy is in Position A and no message if the enemy is in Position B. If the spy sends a message, the pigeon reaches the commander only with probability A) What is the probability that the commander receives no message? Given that the commander receives no message, what is the probability that the enemy is in Position B? B) If the commander receives no message, what is his expected payoff from if he uses strategy r? What is his expected payoff if he uses strategy y? What is his expected payoff if he uses strategy z? C) Show that there is a Nash equilibrium in which the spy sends the carrier pigeon with the message "Position A" if the enemy is in Position A and sends no message if the enemy is in Position B?

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A To calculate the probability that the commander receives no message we need to consider two cases the enemy is in Position A and the enemy is in Position B Case 1 Enemy is in Position A In this case ... View full answer

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