Problem 4: Consider the following two-step dynamic play. Let R> 0. The evaluation v1 is distributed evenly over [0.1] and the evaluation v2 is distributed evenly over [0.1). Stage 0: Nature chooses v1 for player 1 and chooses v2 for player 2. Stage 1: player 1 observes v1 (not v2) and chooses the contribution c1 2 0; Stage 2: player 2 observes v2 and c1 and chooses to make the contribution c2 2 0. The payments are as follows: (i) If c1 + c2 0. The evaluation v1 is distributed evenly over [0.1] and the evaluation v2 is distributed evenly over [0.1). Stage 0: Nature chooses v1 for player 1 and chooses v2 for player 2. Stage 1: player 1 observes v1 (not v2) and chooses the contribution c1 2 0; Stage 2: player 2 observes v2 and c1 and chooses to make the contribution c2 2 0. The payments are as follows: (i) If c1 + c2