Problem 9: Consider a partial equilibrium economy in which two individuals have utility functions given by Lil-(mm) = m + W. Individual 1 is endowed with L01 units of the numeraire. Individual 2 has no endowment but owns a 100% share in a firm with production function x = my, 1/ > 0. a) Identify conditions constituting a competitive equilibrium based on the given preferences, endowments, and ownership shares, Then, define Pareto Efficiency in this economy. Will the two agents always be indifferent between alternative Pareto Efficient allocations? b) Now, consider the production function x = my from (a). Explain how the associated returns to scale vary with y (if at all). Then, solve for the profitmaximizing net supply function (i.e., the production vector chosen) given exogenously determined 10 and as a function of 1/. Provide intuition for your findings