Procter and Gamble $($P & G$),$ a global consumer products giant, "stormed the Japanese market with American products, Americanmanagers, American sales methods and strategies. The result was disastrous until the companylearnt how to adapt products and marketing style to Japanese culture. P&G which entered the Japanese market in $1973$ lost money until $1987,$ but by $1991$ it became its second largest foreign market."

P&G$,$ acclaimed as "the world's most admired marketing machine" entered India, which has been considered as one of the largest emerging markets, in $1985.$ It entered the Indian detergent marketing in the early nineties with the Ariel brand through P & G India $($in which it had a $51$ percent holding which was raised to$65$ per cent in January $1993,$ the remaining $35$ per cent being held by the public$).$ P& G established P&G Home products, a $100$ per cent subsidiary later $(1993)$ and the Ariel was transferred to it$.$ Besides soaps and detergents, P & G had or introduced later product portfolios like shampoos $($Pantene$)$ medical products $($Viks range, Clearasil and Mediker$)$ and personal products $($Whisper feminine hygiene products, pampers diapers and Old Spice

range of men's toiletries$).$

The Indian detergents and personal care products market was dominated by Hindustan Lever Ltd$.($HLL$).$ In some segments of the personal care products market the multinational Johnson & Johnson has had a strong presence. Tata group's T o c o $,$ which had been in the red for some time, was sold to Hindustan Lever Ltd$.($HLL$).$ HLL$,$ a subsidiary of P&G$\text{'}$s global competitor, has been in India for about a century. The take over of Tomco by HLL further increased its market dominance. In the low priced detergents segment Nirma has established a very strong presence.

Over the period of about one and a half decades since its entry in India, P&G invested several thousand crores. However, dissatisfied with its performance in India, it decided to restructure its operations, which in several respects meant a shrinking of activities $-$ the manpower was drastically cut, and thousands of stockists were terminated. P&G$,$ however holds that. it will continue to invest in India. According to Gary Cofer, the country manager, $"$it takes time to build a business category or brand in India. It is possibly an even more demanding geography than others." China, on the other hand, with business worth several times than in India in less than $12$ years, has emerged as a highly promising market for P&G$.$ When the Chinese market was opened up$,$ P&G was one of the first MNCs to enter. Prior to the liberalisation, Chinese consumers had to content with shoddy products manufactured by government companies. Per capita income of China is substantially higher than india's and the Chinese economywas growing faster than the Indian. Further, the success of the single child concept in China means higher disposable income. Further it is also pointed out that for a global company like P&G$,$ understanding Chinese culture was far easier since the expat Chinese in the US was not very different from those back home where as most Indian expats tended to adapt far more to the cultural nuances of the immigrant country.?

One of P&G$\text{'}$s big bets in India was the compact technology premium detergent brand Ariel. After an initial show, Ariel, however, failed to generate enough sales

consumers seem to have gone by the per kilo cost than the cost per wash propagated by the promotion. To start with, P&G had to import the expensive state$-$of$-$the$-$art ingredients, which attracted heavy customs duties. The company estimated that it would cost Rs$.60$ per kilo for Ariel compared to Rs$.27$ for Surf and Rs$.8$ for Nirma Because of the Rupee devaluation of the early $1990$s$,$ the test market price of Rs$.35$ for $500$ gms was soon Rs$\mathrm{.}41$ by the time the product was launched. HLL fought Ariel back with premium variants of Surf like Surf Excel.

It is pointed out that, $"$in hindsight, even P&G managers privately admit that

bringing in the latest compact technology was a big blunder. In the eighties, P&G

had taken a huge beating in one of its most profitable markets, Japan, at the hands

of local company Kao. Knowing the Japanese consumer's fondness for small things,

Kao weaved magic with its new$-$found compact technology. For a company that prided

itself on technology, the drubbing in Japan was particularlypainful. It was, therefore, decided that compacts would now be the lead brand for the entire Asia$-$Pacific region.

When P&G launched Ariel in India, it hoped that the Indian consumer would devise

the appropriate benchmarks to evaluate Ariel. As compacts promised economy of

use, P&G hoped that consumers would buy into the low$-$cost$-$per$-$wash story. But

selling that story through advertising was particularly difficult, especially since Indian consumers believed that the washing wasn't over unless the bar had been used for

scrubbing. Even though Ariel was targeted at consumers with high disposable income, who represented