Pyramids are rare in US, but dual-class shares are possible. In HK, both pyramids and dual-class shares are possible. Suppose a company XYZ has 95 million class-A shares with 1 vote per share, and 5 million class-B shares with N votes per share. Assume that these 2 classes of shares have the same share price and cash-flow rights per share. Mr. X has all the class-B shares and 0.1million class-A shares. Most of the other shareholders are institutional investors (some are blockholders), who may collude to vote against Mr. X. How much is the minimal value of N so that Mr. X has effective control on XYZ ?

Suppose a company ABC has 100 million shares (single-class). The assets of another company DEF are M1 million shares of ABC. M2 percent of shares of DEF are owned by Mr. A. Suppose almost all the shareholders of ABC and DEF are individuals (none of them is a blockholder), who find it hard to collude to vote. How much are the minimal values of M1 and M2 so that Mr. A has effective control on ABC?

Suppose both XYZ and ABC have the share price of $1. How much is the (direct) investment of Mr. X on the company XYZ? How much is the (indirect) investment of Mr. A on the company ABC ? If both XYZ and ABC now issue cash dividend of $0.1 per share, how much cash dividend will Mr. A and Mr. X get?

Answer rating: 100% (QA)

Effective Control in DualClass Share Structures and Pyramids XYZ Company Minimal value of N for Mr Xs control To have effective controlMrX needs votes exceeding 50 of the totalHis classB shares contribute Nx votesClassA shares contribute 95 million votesSoNx 95 million N 95 million 5 million 19 Therefore the minimal value of N for Mr X ... View the full answer