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Question 5 Select all statements that are true. (Note: Parfiai credit is avaiiabie for this question.) [:1 A Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium of a Bayesian game is a Nash equilibrium of its associated ex-ante normal form game. C] The Revenue Equivalence Theorem implies that every bidder's expected payoff is the same in the all-pay, first-price and second-price auctions. [:1 A subgame in an extensive form game with imperfect information cannot split up or "break" any information set. [:1 A simultaneous game with perfect information cannot be depicted as an extensive form game with imperfect information sets Magnus Blahsen and Ian Nomnomitchy sit down to play a game of chess. Select all features from the list below that MOST LIKELY apply to this situation. (Note: partiai credit is possible for this question.) C] The game is simultaneous, not sequential. [j The game is zero-sum. [j The game involves imperfect information. [3 An individual move in chess is an action, not a strategy. What is the lowest value of p for which Player 1 can choose R in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the following two-player, extensive form game with imperfect information? Nature Fail [pl Success [1 - p] L L R R N N A B a