Question 1 - 10 Marks The following table represents the payoffs to a manager and investor who are about to enter an investing game. Manager Dishonest Honest 20,60 50,30 25,20 25,10 Investor Buy Refuse There is going to be 3 rounds of the game with the investor moving first. The probability of playing the cooperative solution at any decision point is defined with the following formula: P = min (1.00, (0.7 +0.01T)] where is the difference between the expected payoff of continuing and immediately ending the game on that turn. What is the probability that the manager continues the game if they get a second opportunity to either be honest or dishonest? Question 1 - 10 Marks The following table represents the payoffs to a manager and investor who are about to enter an investing game. Manager Dishonest Honest 20,60 50,30 25,20 25,10 Investor Buy Refuse There is going to be 3 rounds of the game with the investor moving first. The probability of playing the cooperative solution at any decision point is defined with the following formula: P = min (1.00, (0.7 +0.01T)] where is the difference between the expected payoff of continuing and immediately ending the game on that turn. What is the probability that the manager continues the game if they get a second opportunity to either be honest or dishonest