Question 1 Consider the game below. Player 2 Player 2 Left Middle Right Left Middle Right Up 2, 3, 1 3, 4,4 5, 5, 3 Up 2, 2, 0 3, 3, 2 0, 2, 2 Player 1 Middle 1, 6, 3 5,3, 3 7, 2, 7 Player 1 Middle 4, 3, 2 2, 2, 1 0, 1, 4 Down 4, 5, 2 4, 6, 5 6, 4, 2 Down 1, 3,0 1, 4, 3 -2, 5,0 Player 3 chooses "Left" Player 3 chooses "Right" a) (6 points) Does this game have a (strict) dominant strategy equilibrium? If so, find it and argue why it is a dominant strategy equilibrium. If not, argue why there isn't a dominant strategy equilibrium. b) (6 points) Apply iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS). Clearly show every step of your iterations. Is this game dominance solvable? Why or why not? c) (13 points) Find all of the Nash equilibria of this game. You have to check for both pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Defend all your answers carefully and show every step of your calculations