QUESTION 1 In static games with complete information, there is at most one Nash equilibrium. O True O False QUESTION 2 A monopolist with a perfectly inelastic demand always sells less than the socially efficient quantity. O True O FalseQUESTION 3 The Chicago School was always in support of small companies threatened by big rivals. Their overall idea was to protect weaker firms rather than the competitive process. O True O False QUESTION 4 In repeated games with an infinite horizon, we are unable to use backward induction to find the subgame perfect equilibrium. O True FalseQUESTION 5 Consider price competition among oligopolists. The best response functions are always downward sloping. O True O False QUESTION 6 A cartel never finds it profitable to reduce the cartel price below the monopoly price. True O FalseQUESTION 7 Consider the Cournot model of quantity competition. Firms always end up producing more than a monopolist would produce. O True O False