Question 10 0.1 pts Consider the following simultaneous-move game that represents the payoffs from different advertising campaigns (low, medium, and high spending) for two political candidates that are running for a particular office. The values in the payoff matrix represent the share of the popular vote earned by each candidate is given below. The equilibrium in dominant strategies Candidate B - low Candidate B - medium Candidate B - high Candidate A - low 50, 50 40, 60 20, 80 Candidate A - medium 60, 40 50, 50 35, 65 Candidate A - high 80, 20 65, 35 50, 50 O is (low, low). O is (medium, medium). O is (high, high). O is (medium, high) O does not exist. Question 11 0.2 pts Consider the simultaneous-move game represented in the following table. If (Bottom, Left) is an equilibrium in dominant strategies, then which of the following inequality must be true? Player B Left Right Top a,b c,d Player A Bottom e,f g,h O ezg O aze O azc